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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
More than a trillion dollars annually is spent on the health care system ....
Despite
increases in medical care spending that are greater than the rate of inflation, population
growth, and Gross Domestic Product growth, there has not been a commensurate
improvement in our health status as a nation ....
Despite our Nation's wealth, the
health care system does not provide coverage to all Americans who want it.1

These words capture both the essence of America's public
health care dilemma and the frustration felt by many of the
lawmakers charged with the duty to solve it. The battle to lower costs
and expand access to health care is not limited to the chambers of
Congress, however. Recently, the fighting has spilled over into the
federal courts as States battle Medicaid beneficiaries over the scope of
the cooperative federal-state Medicaid program. 2 For example, in
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, Michigan recently defended its
Medicaid program against the charge that the State was not doing
enough to ensure that Medicaid-eligible children were taking
advantage of the medical services required under the program. 3 The
plaintiffs, representing Medicaid-eligible children in Michigan, sought
to force the State to take steps to promote increased utilization and
4
provision of such services.
The language of the Medicaid Act ("the Act") does not expressly
5
provide beneficiaries with a private cause of action against the State.
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the case, concluding that the
court did not have jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to sue. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
I.S. 3063, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002). Senator Wyden introduced this bill in October 2002
in order to "establish a Citizens Health Care Working Group to facilitate public debate about
how to improve the health care system for Americans .... "
2.
Robert Pear, Governors Say Medicaid Needs More Federal Help to Control Rising Costs,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at A16; Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Amid Fiscal Crisis, Medicaid is
Facing Cuts from States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at Al. Medicaid is a "cooperative venture
jointly funded between the Federal and State governments.., to assist States in furnishing
medical assistance to eligible needy persons." CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICAID: A BRIEF SUMMARY, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/-overview-medicaremedicaidldefault4.asp (providing an overview of Medicare) (last visited Sept. 22, 2003). It was
enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Id; see also infra Part II.A.
3.
289 F.3d 852, 856 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1045 (2002).
4.
Id.
5.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000); see also Harding v. Summit Med. Ctr., 2002 WL
1453743, at *1 (9th Cir. July 3, 2002); Cabinet for Human Res. v. N. Ky. Welfare Rights Ass'n,
954 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (6th Cir. 1992).
6.
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587-89 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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Circuit ("Sixth Circuit"), following the Supreme Court's admittedly
confusing precedent in this area, 7 reversed, allowing the plaintiffs to
proceed under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.8 Section 1983 supplies a cause
of action for an individual when anyone, acting under color of State
law, deprives that individual of "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 9
The Sixth Circuit held that the Medicaid Act was within the
term "laws" for the purposes of section 1983 because it "was intended
to benefit the putative plaintiff," because it placed "a binding [rather
than precatory] obligation on a government unit," and because the
plaintiffs' asserted interests were not so 'vague and amorphous' that
their enforcement would strain judicial competence." 10 One month
later, however, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the United States
Supreme Court announced that section 1983 provided a cause of
action only for violations of "unambiguously conferred rights,"
specifically precluding actions seeking to secure mere "benefits" or
"interests" created by federal law."
Since the Supreme Court later denied certiorari in both the
13
Westside Mothers case1 2 and a similar case from North Carolina, it
has not ultimately settled the question of whether private plaintiffs
may sue under section 1983 to force a State to comply with specific
Medicaid provisions. A State "must comply with certain requirements
imposed by the [Medicaid] Act and regulations imposed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services" as long as the State
continues to participate in the Medicaid program.1 4 The unanswered
question is whether Medicaid creates a right to certain enumerated
health care services, enforceable by private individuals against
participating States.
This Note concludes that the Act does not (and should not)
confer an enforceable private right to such services.
It further
concludes that the federal courts have distorted the important political

7.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in 2002, stated, "The fact that [many
lower courts] have relied on the same set of opinions from this Court [and reached different
conclusions] suggests that our opinions in this area may not be models of clarity. We therefore
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among lower courts and in the process resolve any
ambiguity in our own opinions." Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002) (citations
omitted).
8.
Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863.
9.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
10. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 862-63 (emphasis added).
11. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
12. 537 U.S. 1045 (2002).
13. Odom v. Antrican, 290 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 973 (2002).
14. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990).
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and financial relationship between Congress and the States by
enforcing Medicaid provisions as if a right to such care existed,
substantially hindering attempts to ensure some adequate level of
health care for all Americans.
Part II briefly discusses the history of Medicaid, describes the
financial and political attractiveness of the Medicaid program to both
the States and Congress, and explains how the federal courts
contribute to the States' present financial crises by imposing precatory
federal health care priorities on the States with a vigor that Congress
never intended.
Part III discusses the development of the Court's section 1983
jurisprudence as it has been applied to rights created by federal
statutes. This Part pays particular attention to the Court's uneasy
role in defining the rights of States and individuals within the context
of cooperative federal-state programs enacted under the spending
clause.
Part IV exposes the conflict between the concept of an
enforceable private right to health care under Medicaid and the
Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, which held
that section 1983 provided a cause of action only where
"unambiguously conferred rights" were implicated.
This Note
concludes that the Medicaid Act does not confer such unambiguous
rights and that the enforcement of Medicaid provisions should be left
solely to the Secretary for Health and Human Services.
Finally, Part V assumes that the Gonzaga decision or its
eventual progeny will preclude plaintiffs from using section 1983 to
enforce a private right to health care under Medicaid and explains
why this is the best result if the United States is to make progress
toward providing access to adequate health care for all citizens. The
result, while perhaps harsh in the short term, will force Congress to
recognize the true economic and political nature of the reforms that
must occur if it is to successfully increase access to adequate health
care services for an expanding Medicaid population.
II. THE FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL REALITY OF MEDICAID: A DEAL WITH
THE DEVIL?

Congress enacted the Medicaid Act in 1965 in order to provide
medical care to certain low-income persons. 15 The Medicaid Act
authorizes Congress to appropriate federal funds for payments to
15. See James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid
Managed Care: Tennessee (Tenncare) as a Case Study and a Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125,
136 (2000).
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States that have developed approved plans for providing health care to
those who cannot otherwise afford it.16 States choosing to develop
health care plans use the congressional funds to pay professionals who
provide health care services to Medicaid-eligible individuals. 17 The
Act outlines minimum standards for State participation, but the
actual implementation of any particular Medicaid program, including
the decision whether to pay for certain kinds of treatment authorized
by the Act, is largely a State concern.18 Although Medicaid is, at least
theoretically, a voluntary program, every State participates in it to
some degree. 19
A. FederalFinancialParticipationand the Externalizationof Political
Costs
The principal allure of the Medicaid program is its funding
scheme. The amount of federal funding that a State receives for its
Medicaid program is a function of the State's own Medicaid spending
and a federal matching formula based primarily on the State's per
capita income. 20
Each State's Medicaid budget, therefore, is a
combination of actual State funding and some amount of federal
assistance, known as "federal financial participation" (FFP).21
Depending on a State's average per capita income, FFP can range
from 50% to 83% of the State's total program costs. 22 Therefore, a
State can provide health care services for low-income individuals at a

16. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) must find
that a State's Medicaid plan satisfies the substantive and procedural requirements of the
Medicaid statute. § 1396a(a)-(b); 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2003).
17. See, e.g., § 1396a(a)(13)(A).
18. § 1396a(a)(17). In Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 (1977), the court stated the following:
Although [the Medicaid Act] does not require states to provide funding for all medical treatment
falling within the ... general categories [of treatment enumerated in the Act], it does require
that State Medicaid plans establish 'reasonable standards ...

for ...

determining ...

the extent

of medical assistance under the plan which. . . are consistent with the objectives of [the Act]."').
As a result of this State autonomy, in 2000, there were "essentially 56 different Medicaid
programs--one for each State, territory, and the District of Columbia.
See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A PROFILE OF MEDICAID:
CHARTBOOK 2000 at 6 (2000).

19. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 15, at 137, 138 n.37.
20. See id. at 138 & n. 40.
21. Id.
22. § 1396d(b). These numbers represent the statutory minimum and maximum figures.
Actual figures vary from year to year. For example, in 2001, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services reported that FFP (or Federal Medical Assistance Percentage) ranged from a
high of 76.8% in Mississippi to a low of 50% in ten States. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Medicaid: A Brief Summary, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/overviewmedicare-medicaidldefault4.asp (last visited July 22, 2003). The average FFP was 57%. Id.
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level that greatly exceeds actual State cost, making it economically
and politically sensible for a State to expand such services well beyond
the limit that cost would normally impose.2 3 Unfortunately, this
funding scheme creates a political "moral hazard," whereby the States
have incentives to expand their Medicaid programs beyond levels that
24
they would be willing or able to fund independently.
Medicaid's cooperative financial arrangement works well to a
point. The States are understandably eager to accept so generous an
Congress benefits, too, by
offer from the federal government.
expanding access to health care in a way that puts much of the
budgetary decision making in the hands of the States-a valuable
arrangement when elections draw near. 25 The State's temptation is to
expand healthcare coverage, ensuring that program costs will
eventually reach a level at which even the State's lesser obligation in
26
the funding of its Medicaid program becomes difficult to pay.
23. For example, a State receiving FFP at a 50% rate would only have to spend $500 million
to provide $1 billion of Medicaid services to its citizens. A State receiving 83% FFP would only
have to spend $170 million to achieve the same result.
24. In 1963, economist Kenneth Arrow first used the term "moral hazard" in the context of
medical insurance. See generally Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Health Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963). Professors Blumstein and Sloan apply the term to
"a broad range of circumstances in which the interest of a rational individual is not identical to
the interest of the larger collective of which that individual is a member." Blumstein & Sloan,
supra note 15, at 139 & n.45. In the Medicaid context, the term describes the fact that the
citizens of all States bear the economic cost of increased Medicaid spending by one State but the
benefits of the increased spending only accrue to the citizens of the State doing the spending. Id.
at 139. Conversely, the benefit realized when one State decreases Medicaid spending is shared
by the citizens of all States, but the cost of that benefit is borne only by the State reducing
Medicaid expenditures. Id. From the point of view of an individual State, the only rational
economic decision is to increase Medicaid spending, leading to a situation where finite federal
health care dollars are stretched to their limit. Id. at 140, 148 n.70 ("Cooperative federalism
makes it economically and politically rational to spend State funds that, were the State paying
the full bill, might not comport with State priorities."); see also Editorial, Runaway Medicaid,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at A18.
25. Total federal Medicaid expenditures are not limited by any cap or ceiling. See HEALTH
CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra note 18, at 8; see also James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and
Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1994). Instead, under the matching formula, the Federal Medicaid
expenditure for any year is solely a function of the discretionary spending of the States on their
respective Medicaid programs. See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra note 18, at 8. Under such a
scheme, it is easy for Congress to deflect the responsibility for increased federal spending, since
no legislator is on record as having directly voted for an increase or decrease in Medicaid
spending. Although the amount of such an "automatic" budgetary item can be increased or
decreased by bills expanding or shrinking the scope of coverage and the size of the eligible
population, this only indirectly affects absolute expenditures, since the States have considerable
discretion in managing these aspects of their Medicaid programs. Id.
26. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Fiscal Health of States Is Worsening, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2003,
at A2 ("The National Conference of State Legislatures ...said States' current budget gaps have
grown to a total of nearly $26 billion .... [Tihe shortfall projected for fiscal year 2004 ... is

forecast to be at least $68.5 billion." Furthermore, "[tihe NCSL survey found that for fiscal year
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Cutting expenditures matched by FFP is difficult because, for
every dollar that a State wishes to save, the State has to cut between
$2 and $6 in program costs. 27 Such a decision is politically unpopular
for obvious reasons. Professor James Blumstein has referred to this
inability to slow the growth of leveraged cooperative programs as the
political "narcotic effect." 28 Professor Blumstein's label colorfully
describes how participating States become increasingly dependent on
federal money in order to meet political and social goals. A State
reducing its own Medicaid expenditures must endure a painful
economic withdrawal period as it also weans itself off of the
accompanying federal funds. The State is then forced to raise taxes or
cut other programs in order to make ends meet, alienating important
political constituencies in the process.29
Congress has used the addictive effects of FFP to aggressively
externalize some costs of its own. Once the States were politically and
fiscally locked-in to the Medicaid program, Congress began imposing
greater obligations on the States in exchange for FFP. 30 Congress
thereby squeezed more political capital from every federal matching
dollar. Unfortunately, this congressional exploitation of the narcotic
effect made the States increasingly desperate to find some way of
31
coping with the growing burdens of Medicaid compliance.
B. Managed Care:A Solution to the Cost Problem?
The Medicaid Act requires participating States to provide care
that is deemed "medically necessary" by a treating physician in any
given case. 32 While considerable debate rages over the propriety of
2003... 13 States have cut Medicaid spending .... Medicaid and education are the States'
biggest costs."); see also Pear, supra note 2; Pear & Toner, supra note 2.
27. This disparity results from the fact that FFP puts the State in what could be described
as a leveraged position with respect to its investment in health care. See supra notes 22-26 and
accompanying text. When the State removes funds from its Medicaid program, it loses the
amount of FFP that was dependent on those funds. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying
text. The actual figure, of course, would depend on the level of FFP. See supra notes 22-26 and
accompanying text.
28. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 15, at 141-42.
29. Id; see also Calmes, supra note 26.
30. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 15, at 142-44.
31. See id. at 148-49.
32. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 508 (1989) (holding that Congress has
authorized "reimbursement for medically necessary services generally"); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 994 (1982) (holding that an individual seeking Medicaid assistance "must seek
medically necessary services"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (holding that
"Congress has opted to subsidize medically necessary services generally"); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438, 444-45 (1977) (holding, "[The Medicaid Act] makes no reference.., to any.., particular
medical procedure. Instead, the statute is cast in terms that require participating States to
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including economic
concerns in treatment decisions, some
commentators recognize that the medical necessity standard
encompasses not a single level, but a continuum of medical care.33
One end of the continuum represents the level of care that is medically
adequate and economically efficient (in terms of the cost of the care
versus the benefit of the care to the patient) for the treatment of a
particular condition. 34 The other end symbolizes the level of care that
might produce the maximum possible medical benefit to the patient,
notwithstanding the marginal cost of that care.3 5 Applying this
flexible concept of medical necessity, the States found that they could
reduce Medicaid expenditures without visibly cutting health care
services by encouraging doctors treating Medicaid patients to
interpret "medical necessity" as a standard of medical adequacy rather
than one of maximum benefit.36

provide financial assistance with respect to... broad categories of medical treatment. But
nothing in the statute suggests that participating States are required to fund every medical
procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical care." The Court added,
"Although serious statutory questions might be presented if a State Medicaid plan excluded
necessary medical treatment from its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the
Act for a State to refuse to fund unnecessary-though perhaps desirable-medical services."
(citations omitted)).
33. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 169-71 (2d ed. 1998).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. It is important to note that "the threat of lower quality [in health care] should not
ring the death knell for proposed policy shifts." Blumstein, supra note 25, at 1466. As Professor
Blumstein points out,
[clost-benefit and risk-benefit calculations occur constantly and are an integral part of the
economic marketplace. If lower quality were the death knell, we would not have different
segments in the automobile industry-only the Lexus, the Infiniti, and the Mercedes would be
manufactured.
In short, policies that lower the quality of care may be rational if higher levels of quality can be
achieved only at extremely high costs. Intuitively, we all engage in such balancing. We take
prudent (and sometimes even imprudent) risks to achieve objectives that are important to us, or
because we believe that the cost of safety is excessive in that it would cause us to forego other
valuable benefits. Indeed, these kinds of economic trade-offs are routinely made in the medical
care marketplace, but usually out of the public's sight. But only academic types, who are not
running for public office, are prepared to state what should be obvious-that it might be socially
optimal to have lower quality medical care, at least in some circumstances, if the cost of the
highest quality care is too high. In no other marketplace do we say 'spare no expense, cost is
irrelevant.' It is not radical to suggest that the highest levels of quality might be sub-optimal and
that the diminution-of-quality argument should not be checkmate in health policy debates.
Id. at 1466-67. Such cost-benefit decisions are evident in the fact that different qualities of
artificial hips exist, as do different contrast agents used in radiological examinations, some of
which are tremendously more expensive than others. Id. at 1467 n.27. Further,
[e]vidence shows that clinical uncertainty rather than a single scientific standard governs the
actual practice of medicine. There are dramatically different procedure rates in similar regions
for similar conditions.
When variables are controlled for potentially relevant patient
characteristics such as age, education, and income, researchers still observe widely divergent
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The most formidable hurdle that the States faced in their
search for Medicaid efficiency was the traditional fee-for-service
system of health care delivery, under which a State participating in
the Medicaid program was obligated to pay for any care provided or
recommended by a physician. 37 The State had but one duty-to write
a check. 38 This system created an additional moral hazard in which
physicians had incentives to provide more and more care without
regard to its cost, maximizing their own profits while maintaining the
39
moral and ethical high ground by also maximizing care to patients.
States realized that they would have to replace the fee-for-service
health care model if they were to achieve cost-containment goals.
One solution was to administer a State Medicaid plan through
a Managed Care Organization (MCO).
MCOs are health plans
organized in such a way that physicians are encouraged to provide the
least expensive medically adequate treatment for a particular
condition. 40 A typical MCO receives a periodic, capitated (per head)
payment for each person enrolled in its health care program. 4 1 This
arrangement places the MCO at financial risk because it is obligated
to provide medical care to members even if the cost of that care
rates for such procedures as tonsillectomies, adenoidectomies, and hysterectomies in
demographically comparable regions.
Id. at 1479. Such evidence shows that there is ample room in many treatment decisions for a
cost-benefit analysis.
37. HAVIGHURSTETAL., supra note 33, at 169-71, 281-82.
38. Id. at 277, 281.
39. This particular moral hazard results from the fact that the doctor's ethical and financial
interests and the patient's heath care quality interests are aligned with each other, but not with
the public's financial interest. More care for the patient means that the patient is no worse off in
terms of his health; the doctor is better off in terms of his bottom-line and his moral and ethical
duty to do his best for each patient; and, the public is worse off in terms of expense. For a more
thorough discussion of the nature of a moral hazard, see HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33, at
181, 183, 208-09, Blumstein, supra note 25, at 1465, and supra note 24 and accompanying text,.
40. "[The essential feature that distinguishes [MCOs] from conventional health insurance
is a contractual commitment to provide or arrange for care, not just to indemnify the subscriber
for costs he or she reasonably incurs." HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33, at 213-14.
Additionally, the MCO contracts with physicians who agree to provide necessary care under the
terms of the plan, but a contractual arrangement may not directly influence a treating
physician's medical judgment in any given case without potentially exposing the MCO to liability
for bad results. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Bowman v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 188 F. Supp. 2d 870 (M.D. Tenn. 2000); Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452
S.E.2d 589 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). The contractual framework creates incentives for the MCO's
participating providers to consider the relative costs and benefits of the health care services that
they provide. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 33, at 1181-82. Contracts between MCOs and
providers address issues such as "the form and amount of the provider's compensation,
utilization management and other administrative requirements, and the terms on which a
provider's participation may be terminated." Id. "Such contracts frequently introduce financial
incentives by which the plan hopes to discourage overutilization." Id. at 1182.
41.

HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33, at 209.
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exceeds the aggregate capitated payments. 42
If the capitated
payments exceed the cost of caring for enrollees, however, the MCO
retains a profit.
Physicians participating in an MCO are encouraged to lower
the cost of patient care through ownership interests in the MCO,
salary and bonus structures, withhold payments contingent on
specified economic targets, and other arrangements. 43 The resulting
health care model costs less to operate, since over time the combined
cost-benefit decisions of the participating physicians tend to push the
standard of medical necessity away from the level of all maximum
benefit and toward the level of adequate care. 44
Congress passed legislation in the early 1980s allowing States
to require that all Medicaid beneficiaries receive medical care through
MCOs. 45 Most States have since implemented such reforms. 46 By
allowing managed care in the Medicaid context, Congress
acknowledged that economic considerations are an important part of
the Medicaid calculus. In the final analysis, however, Congress has
shown little sympathy to States increasingly burdened by Medicaid
obligations. 47 This tension between federal health care priorities and
State economic realities often leads to litigation by private parties
seeking some federal health care benefit at State expense. 48

42. Id. at 1182.
43. Id. at 209, 1181-82; see also James F. Blumstein, Medicine Isn't an Economics-Free
Zone, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2001, at A14 (noting that, fundamentally, MCOs "ask if treatment,
even if effective, is of sufficient benefit or priority to warrant expenditure from a common pool of
insurance money").
44. HAVIGHURST ETAL., supra note 33, at 169-71.
45. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2173, 95 Stat. 808
(1981). Subsequent legislation has made it even easier for States to administer their Medicaid
programs through managed care organizations. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, § 4712, 111 Stat. 509 (1997).
46. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supranote 33, at 283-85.
47. See, e.g., Bipartisan State Budget Relief Act of 2003, S. 138, 108th Cong. § 1(b) (2003)
(giving emergency short term aid to the States by temporarily increasing FFP percentages, but
requiring States to accept reduced FFP in the future in exchange for the help today); see also
Calmes, supra note 26.
48. See, e.g., Odom v. Antrican, 290 F.3d 178, 178 (4th Cir. 2002); Westside Mothers v.
Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 852 (6th Cir. 2002); John B. v. Menke, 176 F. Supp. 2d 786, 786 (M.D.
Tenn. 2001).
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C. EPSDT, Managed Care, and the Federal Courts: Westside Mothers
v. Haveman
1. EPSDT and Managed Care
One of the most comprehensive provisions of the Medicaid
statute is its Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment
Services (EPSDT) requirement. 49 The EPSDT provisions list the
medical services that a State must provide to Medicaid-eligible
children under the age of 21.50 The list of required services is
51
extensive. Generally, whatever care a child needs, that child gets.
EPSDT requires the State program to provide, at intervals
meeting "reasonable standards of medical practice," comprehensive
physical examinations, health and developmental histories, blood and
laboratory tests, immunizations, vision services, dental services,
hearing services, and health education services. 52
Furthermore,
States must fund treatment "to correct or ameliorate defects and
physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the
screening services, whether or not such services are generally covered
under the State plan." 53 Federal utilization goals require each State
to take steps to ensure that 80 percent of its Medicaid-eligible children
are getting these services. 54 Finally, each State is expected to provide
transportation, scheduling, and other ancillary services if such
55
services will help the State meet its utilization goals.
The EPSDT provisions requiring States to provide any
treatment recognized by the Medicaid Act and recommended by a
physician largely thwart attempts to control costs through managed
care. 56 A State's decision to exclude certain health services from its

49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2001).
50. § 1396d(a)(4)(B).
51. Id.; see also John A. Flippen, Note, The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and
Treatment Program and Managed Medicaid Mental Health Care: The Need to Reevaluate the
EPSDT in the Managed CareEra, 50 VAND. L. REV. 683, 689-90 (1997).
52. §1396d(r).
53. § 1395(r)(5).
54. Wendy Wendland, Key Programs Face Threats, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 21, 2001, at
1A.
55. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.62, 431.53 (2002).
56. See, e.g., John B. v. Menke, 176 F. Supp. 2d 786, 800-05 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (holding,
"[a]though States may take advantage of Medicaid waivers [allowing the provision of Medicaid
services through contracts with managed care organizations] ... the 'waiver may not be used to
deny, delay, or limit access to medically necessary services that are required to be available...
under federal EPSDT rules.' EPSDT services ... may not be limited, even pursuant to a
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Medicaid program is meaningless in the EPSDT context.5 7 Where
children are concerned, the statute requires the State to provide any
treatment within the general Medicaid Act even if the State would not
cover the same treatment for an adult. 58 Critically, the operative
language of section 1396d(r)(5) requires the State to pay for any
"medically necessary" treatment that "correct[s] or ameliorate[s]"
medical conditions discovered by the required screenings.5 9 This
language mandates a standard of medical necessity that strives for
maximum benefits without consideration of marginal costs,
60
eviscerating a managed care arrangement.
Congress enacted the EPSDT provisions of the Act in 1967,
when utilization levels were much lower and fee-for-service was the
dominant delivery model for health care. 61 In today's health care
environment of skyrocketing costs and increasing utilization of
Medicaid services, the standard of medical necessity embodied in the
EPSDT provisions is economically unworkable. 62 If managed care is
not permitted in the EPSDT context, States cannot effectively control
the health care costs incurred by millions of Medicaid-eligible
children.

Medicaid waiver" (emphasis added)). For a discussion of why a standard of medical necessity is
problematic in the managed care context, see supra notes 59-60, 248-251 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
58. EPSDT requires a State to pay for any of the services enumerated in 42 U.S.C. section
1396d(a) in addition to the special services listed in section 1396d(r). It is difficult to conceive of
a non-experimental medical service not contained in one of these two subsections.
59. See, e.g., § 1396d(r)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (stating the term "early and periodic screening,
diagnostic, and treatment services" means the following items and services: Screening
services... which are provided ... at intervals which meet reasonable standards of medical and
dental practice, and ... at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary .... ).
60. The language of the statute seems to indicate that, notwithstanding any contractual
arrangement between the State and an MCO, the MCO would be required to provide, and the
State would be required to pay extra for, any treatment that, in the medical judgment of a
physician, would benefit the child. See § 1396(d)(r)(5). This requirement might even force the
State to pay for "experimental" procedures. See, e.g., Brandi Hinds v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Tenn., Inc., No. 3:95-0508, at 10-17 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 28, 1995) (unpublished opinion
unavailable electronically and on file with author) (holding that Tennessee's Medicaid
Demonstration Project, TennCare, was required to fund an arguably experimental small bowel
transplant for a Medicaid-eligible child under the EPSDT requirements).
61. Flippen, supra note 51, at 684, 689.
62. For a brief discussion of the evolution and rejection of various Medicaid reimbursement
schemes focusing on the shift from retrospective (fee-for-service) payment to managed care and
prospective payment, see Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 505-08 (1990). Each change
resulted in increased State control over reimbursement procedures. Id. The uncertainty of
future cost created by the "all beneficial and preventative care" standard seemingly embraced by
the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act makes any prospective payment scenario difficult to
enforce. See § 1396d(r)(5).
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2. EPSDT and the Courts
Expenditures for EPSDT services, especially those designed to
maximize utilization of the services, are closely scrutinized when
State officials begin to feel the unpleasant budgetary effects of their
increasingly expensive Medicaid plan. The States could simply begin
to cut services as fiscally necessary, forcing the Secretary for Health
and Human Services and Congress to address the funding and
coverage issues. There are grave political and social costs associated
with such action, since cutting Medicaid services would only serve to
harm those that the program was designed to help. 63 Additionally, as
Westside Mothers illustrates, when a State cuts its EPSDT
64
expenditures it risks being sued by welfare-rights groups.
In most cases the federal courts enforce the letter of the
EPSDT provisions and, notwithstanding the precatory nature of the
Medicaid Act, 65 allow private plaintiffs to force the States to provide
the enumerated services. 66
Such judicial action usurps the
enforcement role of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
imposes burdens on the States that Congress never intended.
Congress is able to watch silently as the courts enforce federal health
care policies at the expense of the already economically suffering
States. Professor Blumstein refers to this phenomenon as "legislative
67
schizophrenia."
3. Legislative Schizophrenia and the Westside Mothers Litigation
Legislative schizophrenia is based on the concept that
sweeping humanitarian goals "are widely shared in the abstract."6 In
other words, it is hard to argue with the following statement: "Other
63. States only cut Medicaid expenditures as a last resort, and while there is substantial
debate over the characteristics of the population that Medicaid should cover, no State wants to
see its most vulnerable citizens left without adequate health care. See, e.g., Rosen v. Tenn.
Comm'r of Fin. & Admin., 288 F.3d 918, 920-31 (6th Cir. 2002) (illustrating how the State of
Tennessee expanded TennCare, its health care program, to cover Medicaid-ineligible individuals
in addition to its preexisting Medicaid population. The State was not required to cover these
individuals under the Medicaid program but was sued when it tried to close enrollment of this
class of individuals and drop individuals owing payment of TennCare premiums.); see also Marci
A. Hamilton, Assessing Claims that Federalism and States Are Anti-civil Rights, at
http://www.cnn.com/20O3[LAW01/O6/findlaw.-analysis.hamilton.findlaw/index.html (last visited
July 27, 2003).
64. 289 F.3d 852, 856 (6th Cir. 2002).
65. See infra Parts II.C.3, IV.B (discussing the precatory nature of the Medicaid statute).
66. See e.g., Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863.
67. James F. Blumstein, Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill-Burton Act as a Case
Study, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1227, 1233 (1984).

68.

Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).

1492

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1479

things being equal, it would be better to provide improved access to
medical care to indigent patients."69 As a result, legislators "are
unlikely to strenuously oppose pious aspirational language of a
general precatory character in health policy legislation," even if they
do oppose mechanisms by which the precatory language could be
enforced. 70 Such enforcement gaps are accepted as a necessary part of
political compromise, so Congress gives the supervising agency (the
Department of Health and Human Services for Medicaid) wide
71
discretion in its enforcement of the statutory language.
Westside Mothers illustrates the reality of legislative
schizophrenia and of the State struggle to make ends meet under the
increasing pressure of Medicaid obligations. In 1999, several welfarerights groups filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction that
would have forced the State of Michigan to spend more money to make
sure that EPSDT utilization goals were met. 72 The plaintiffs claimed
that only 35 percent of Michigan's eligible children had received the
required EPSDT services in 1997, and that this percentage had
dropped for the second consecutive year. 73 The lawsuit, in addition to
asking for the provision of required medical services for children,
sought to force the State to better inform the parents of eligible
children about EPSDT services and to provide transportation and
scheduling assistance to the children and their parents, making it
74
easier for them to take advantage of such services.
The plaintiffs' most intriguing claim was that Michigan
"develop[ed] a program ...lack[ing] the capacity to deliver to eligible
Michigan officials
children the care required by [Medicaid]. ' 75
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Wendland, supranote 54.
73. See id.
74. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 856 (6th Cir. 2002).
75. Id. The statutes allegedly implicated by Michigan's Medicaid program were 42 U.S.C.
section 1396a(a)(8), which provides that "[a] state plan for medical assistance.., must provide
that all individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have
opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to
all eligible individuals"; section 1396a(a)(30)(A), which provides that the plan must "assure that
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent
that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area"; and §
1396u-2(b)(5), which provides that
[elach Medicaid managed care organization shall provide the State and Secretary [of Health and
Human Services] with adequate assurances (in a time and manner determined by the Secretary)
that the organization, with respect to a service area, has the capacity to serve expected
enrollment in such service area, including assurances that the organization ... offers an
appropriate range of services and access to preventive and primary care services for the
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disputed the utilization statistics that the plaintiffs relied upon to
make this claim, maintaining that the utilization of EPSDT services
had actually increased over the last two years. 76 Crucial to the
plaintiffs' argument was the fact that since 1997, Michigan operated
on a waiver from the Health Care Finance Administration allowing
the State to provide Medicaid services (including EPSDT services)
through an MCO. 77 In other words, the plaintiffs were claiming that
Michigan's approach to managed care violated the EPSDT provisions
of the Medicaid Act.
Interestingly, the plaintiffs' attack on Michigan's Medicaid
program focused primarily on Michigan's failure to achieve overall
utilization goals for EPSDT services rather than on individual cases in
which care was denied. 78 It is true that when a State's Medicaid
compliance is in question the relevant inquiry under the Medicaid
statute concerns a State's program as a whole and not individual
instances of noncompliance. 79 Michigan's Medicaid program as a
whole, however, was acceptable to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. 0 Michigan correctly pointed out that it was in weekly
contact with federal officials and that the office of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services had continually approved the State's
ongoing Medicaid
program in required
quarterly audits.8'
Importantly, the Westside Mothers plaintiffs challenged the actions of
the State of Michigan and not the determination of the Department
for Health and Human Services that Michigan's Medicaid program
was in compliance the Medicaid Act.8 2 Under these circumstances, it
seems that the plaintiffs would have to extrapolate the existence of a
systemic failure of Michigan's EPSDT program from many individual

population expected to be enrolled in such service area, and.., maintains a sufficient number,
mix, and geographic distribution of providers of services.
76. See Wendland, supra note 54; see also Wendy Wendland, State Sued over Kids'
Checkups, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 13, 1999, at lB. The State vehemently disputed the
plaintiffs data, claiming that 93 percent (93%) of eligible children had at least one physical
examination of the eyes, ears, nose, throat, chest, abdomen, and extremities in 1998, that 83
percent (83%) had received at least one preventive-care doctor's visit by their first and second
birthdays in 1997, that 67 percent (67%) had a vision screening, that 63 percent (63%) had a
hearing screening, that 47 percent (47%) had a dental examination, and that 46 percent (46%)
were tested for lead poisoning. Id. Furthermore, the State asserted that the statistics the
plaintiff provided did not take into account eligible children enrolled in managed care programs.
Id.
77. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 856.
78. Id.; see also Wendland, supra note 54.
79. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
80. See Wendland, supranote 54.
81. Id.
82.

See id.
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instances of noncompliance rather than from Michigan's failure to
meet utilization goals set by the agency.8 3 This the plaintiffs did not
do.

84

The plaintiffs claimed that they were asking a simple question
of statutory compliance but the case actually presented several larger
issues. Should a court, at the request of a private plaintiff, try to "fix"
a State's Medicaid program, especially when the Secretary of Health
and Human Services has found the program to comply with federal
law? Should a court fill in the gaps of precatory federal health care
policy with its own ideas, enabling Congress to externalize the
political costs associated with making tough, detailed enforcement
decisions? Should a court impose a massive financial burden (even a
purely prospective one) on a State that has structured its conduct and
finances according to its ongoing, functional relationship with the
relevant federal officials? This is legislative schizophrenia in action.
III. SECTION 1983 AND THE SPENDING CLAUSE
A. Section 1983 Generally
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 was originally enacted as the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871.85 The goal of this act was "to override the corrupting
influence of the Ku Klux Klan and its sympathizers on the
governments and law enforcement agencies of the Southern States,
and of course one strong motive behind its enactment was grave
congressional concern that the State courts had been deficient in
protecting federal rights."8 6 In other words, section 1983 was enacted
to protect the civil rights of "newly freed slaves and union
sympathizers" by providing "a neutral federal forum" in which an
aggrieved citizen could avoid the biases inherent in State courts of the
87
post-Civil War era.
83. Although federal regulations had set Michigan's utilization goal for EPSDT services at
80 percent, the Secretary's continual approval of Michigan's Medicaid program, notwithstanding
the State's failure to meet this statistical goal, shows that this number, at least in the opinion of
the relevant regulatory authority, is aspirational rather than rigidly enforced. See id. (citing the
EPSDT services goal). Any criticism that a particular Medicaid program was not capable of
providing required care, therefore, would need to point to individual instances where the
required care was refused or not available in order to show that a larger systemic problem
existed. Such evidence would have to be more than anecdotal and would have to achieve some
sort of critical mass in order to support a serious allegation of structural noncompliance.
84. See id.
85. H.R. REP. No. 96-548, at 1 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2609, 2609.
86. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980) (citations omitted).
87. H.R. REP. NO. 96-548, at 1.
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The statute reads, in relevant part,
[e]very person who, under color of any [law] of any State... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States] ...
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress .... 88

The statute remains today effectively unchanged from its
original version.8 9 How did a statute enacted to address civil rights
abuses in the Reconstruction Era 90 evolve into an instrument by which
private plaintiffs may impose judicially created health care policies on
the States under the auspices of a voluntary federal-state program
enacted under the spending clause? 91
B. Section 1983 and the Spending Clause
While section 1983 was enacted in 1871, the Supreme Court
did not interpret it as protecting statutorily created rights of any kind
until 1980.92 One year later, however, in Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, then-Justice Rehnquist addressed the more
specific question of whether a statute enacted under the spending
clause could create rights enforceable under section 1983. 93 He wrote,
"[iun legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical
remedy for State noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is
not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by
94
the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State."
Congress can write other remedies into the statute itself, but,
as Justice Rehnquist continued, "[1]egislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions." 95 As such, "if Congress intends to impose a condition on
the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.
By
insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
89. See § 1983. The statute was amended in 1979 to include language applying the statute
to the District of Columbia and again in 1996 to limit the scope of injunctive relief against State
judicial officers, but the heart of the statute remains unchanged. Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat.
1284 (amending in 1979); Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3853 (amending in 1996).
90. H.R. REP. No. 96-548, at 1.
91. The spending clause empowers Congress to allocate and spend federal funds. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have the Power To... provide for the Common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States").
92. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
93. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id. 451 U.S. at 17.
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to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
' 96
their participation."
Only twice since Pennhurst has the Court found legislation
enacted pursuant to the spending power to confer private rights
enforceable under section 1983: Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and HousingAuthority and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Association.97 Even in these two cases, however, the Court avoided a
searching inquiry into the source of each asserted "right," leaving
serious questions regarding the applicability of section 1983 to
legislation enacted under the spending clause.
1. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority
In Wright, tenants living in low-income housing projects sued
the owner of the projects under section 1983, alleging that the owner
had violated federal statutes and regulations by overbilling the
tenants for their utilities. 98 The Housing Act provided that "[a] family
shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter [no
more than a specified percentage of its income], ' 99 and that the rent
amount included an allowance for "reasonable amounts of utilities" as
defined by the Public Housing Authority. 100
The Court applied a three-part test to determine whether the
statute conferred a "right to a reasonable utility allowance"
enforceable under section 1983.101 First, the Court asked whether the
language of the statute itself created a private right in the
plaintiffs. 10 2 Drawing from the general language of the statute, the
Court of Appeals had held that "the tenants were the intended
beneficiaries [of the] Housing Act," 10 3 and that the tenants had
"certain rights" under the Act. 10 4
The Court accepted this
105
conclusion.

96.
97.

Id.
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment &

Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
98.

Wright, 479 U.S. at 419.

99. Id. at 420 n.2.
100. Id. at 420 n.3.
101. Id. at 423-32
102. Id. at 424.
103. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 771 F.2d 833, 835 (4th Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 837.
105. Wright, 479 U.S. at 424 ("For the Court of Appeals, the barrier was not the lack of
statutory right or its quality or enforceability."). This statement ignores the fact that the court of
appeals failed to undertake any detailed analysis of the source of the "certain rights" created by
the Housing Act. See generally Wright, 771 F.2d at 837.
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Second, the Court asked whether Congress foreclosed private
enforcement through its chosen administrative scheme. 10 6
In
determining that the administrative remedies contained in the
Housing Act were not "sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate
congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under section
10 7
1983," the Court first examined the legislative history of the Act.
Comments made during a House subcommittee hearing indicated
some recognition of a tenant's right to privately enforce provisions of
the Act in the federal courts.1 08 More convincing, however, was the fact
that Congress enacted but later repealed a provision of the Housing
Act that would have limited the judicial review of agency decisions.1 0 9
Furthermore, certain regulations implicitly contemplated judicial
review of Public Housing Authority actions.1 1 0 Finally, the Court
noted that statutes in which it found congressional preclusion of a
remedy under section 1983 had "themselves provided for private
judicial enforcement, thereby evidencing congressional intent to
supplant the section 1983 remedy." '1
Third, the Court asked whether the asserted right to a
"reasonable allowance for utilities" was so "vague and amorphous"
that it was "beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce." 11 2 In
finding that the right was not "vague and amorphous," the Court held
that the relevant regulations "specifically set out guidelines that [local
11 3
housing officials] were to follow in establishing utility allowances."
106. Wright, 479 U.S. at 424.
107. Id. at 424-26.
108. Id. at 425 & n.7.
109. Id. at 425-26.
110. Id. at 427.
111. Id. at 428. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004-05 (1984); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). Where a statute includes a
comprehensive judicial or remedial scheme that provides for private action, it does not include
additional private remedies under section 1983. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423. While a statutory
provision for private judicial enforcement is required to find that Congress precluded a private
remedy under section 1983 through a "comprehensive administrative scheme," the Gonzaga case
suggests that a less comprehensive administrative scheme might be one factor to consider in
determining whether a private right exists at all. 536 U.S. 273 (2002); see infra notes 175-180
and accompanying text.
112. Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32.
113. Id. The regulations provided, "The complexity and elaborateness of the methods chosen
by the [Public Housing Authority (PHA)], in its discretion... will be dependent upon the data
available to the PHA and the extent of the administrative resources reasonably available to the
PHA to be devoted to the collection of such data, the formulation of methods of calculation, and
actual calculation and monitoring of the allowances." 49 Fed. Reg. 31,399, 31,409-10 (Aug. 7,
1984) (emphasis added). The regulation recommends several sources of relevant data including
technical data concerning energy requirements of appliances, the climactic location of the
housing project, the size of the dwelling units, the type of construction and design of the housing
project, the physical condition, including insulation and weatherization, of the housing project,
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Consequently, the "benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants...
114
[were] not ...beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce."

the temperature of domestic hot water, and any number of local, State, and federal government
statistical studies. Id. While the Wright Court might have utilized these sources in order to set
a "reasonable allowance for utilities" as required by the statute, the question whether an
asserted right is too "vague and amorphous" for the judiciary to enforce would seem to
contemplate "rights" such as this. See 479 U.S. at 431. Importantly, the plaintiff does not
challenge administrative action here. See id. Instead, he asks the Court to declare his "right to a
reasonable allowance for utilities." See id. Where a supposed "right" depends on a highly
technical inquiry and the ultimate discretion of administrative officials (who essentially could
change or eliminate the supposed "right" at any time), the issue seems particularly well suited to
administrative oversight, subject only to the procedural safeguards mandated by the statute or
regulations and, of course, judicial review of administrative action under the appropriate
standard of deference. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984), the Court held
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle
of deference to administrative interpretations 'has been consistently followed by this Court
whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations. If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that
were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned. (citations omitted).
As to the related question of judicial competence in scientific areas, Professor Mark Hall has
concluded
[T]he judicial system is ill-suited to decide scientific questions. Lay judges and juries must rely
on expert testimony, and the adversarial setting in which this evidence is presented tends to
distort its accuracy. In contrast to scientific processes, litigants in the adversarial system
carefully choose their witnesses with tactical advantages in mind.
Witnesses that are
opinionated and dogmatic are favored over those that have a more balanced view of the
competing merits. Moreover, because winning, not truth-finding, is the ultimate objective,
litigants resort to tactics that actively undermine truthfulness from a scientific perspective, such
as exploiting the demeanor of the opposing scientists and launching ad hominem attacks on their
personal credibility. In this adversarial climate, it is difficult for judges and juries to divine
scientific fact from science fiction.
MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF
RATIONING MECHANISMS 69 (1997). The Court's statement of the supposed "right" at issue in
Wright simply fails to encompass the scope of the inquiry required. See 479 U.S. at 431. The
same arguably could be said about the Medicaid provisions at issue in Westside Mothers. See 289
F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
114. Wright, 479 U.S. at 432. The Court's choice of the term "benefits" now has a
significance that it did not have at the time. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. Under the Court's
opinion in Gonzaga, section 1983 provides a cause of action only where a federal "right" is
involved, and mere "benefits" are specifically excluded from its scope of coverage. Id. Whether
this holding indicates that the Court wrongly decided Wright or that the Court merely used the
term with no way of anticipating its future significance remains an open question. See infra
notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
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2. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association
In Wilder, the Court focused on the language of the 1980 Boren
Amendment ("the Amendment") to the Medicaid Act. 115
The
Amendment required a participating State to reimburse providers in
its Medicaid program at rates that "the State finds, and makes
assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate
to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and
Importantly, neither the
economically operated facilities."1 1 6
Amendment nor any regulations promulgated by the Secretary for
Health and Human Services defined "reasonable and adequate" or
"efficiently and economically," giving the States the power to interpret
these critical terms.1 1 7 Ultimately at issue was whether the language
of the Amendment created a substantive right to such "reasonable and
adequate" rates enforceable by health care providers under section
1983.118
The Court emphasized that section 1983 provided a cause of
action only for violations of "rights, privileges, or immunities," not for
mere violations of federal law, then applied a three-part inquiry to
determine whether the Amendment created such a right.1 19 First, the
Court asked whether the Amendment "was intended to benefit the
putative plaintiff," the individuals and entities providing medical
services to the beneficiaries of Virginia's Medicaid program.' 20 In a
one-paragraph analysis reminiscent of that in Wright,1 21 the Court
held that health care providers were the beneficiaries of the
Amendment because the Amendment was "phrased in terms
benefiting health care providers."' 22 Specifically, the Amendment
"require[d] a State plan to [pay for] ...the hospital services, nursing
115. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 501-02 (1990).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 & Supp. V) (codifying the Boren Amendment).
117. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 507.
118. Id. at 509-10.
119. This test differed from that announced in Wright, but the elements of the Wright test
were all present. See id. at 508-09; supra notes 101-114 and accompanying text. Importantly,
the Wilder court seemed to split the question whether a right existed in the first place into two
parts. See infra notes 120-133 and accompanying text. Then, the court asked if the right was
too "vague and amorphous" to enforce. See infra notes 134-137 and accompanying text. Finally,
the Wilder court examined the supposed right in the context of the administrative enforcement
scheme of the underlying statute to determine whether Congress intended to preclude private
enforcement through a comprehensive administrative scheme. See infra notes 139-140 and
accompanying text. It is instructive to think of Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga not as announcing
different tests, but as evidencing the Court's evolving understanding of the relationship between
section 1983 and the spending clause.
120. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.
121. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
122. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
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facility services, and services in an intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded .... -123
Second, the Court asked whether the Amendment "impose[d] a
'binding obligation' on the States," rather than a mere "congressional
preference for a certain kind of conduct."'124 In determining that the
Amendment obligated the States to set "reasonable and adequate
rates," the Court looked to the text of the Amendment, the
Amendment's role as a condition of federal funding, the legislative
history of the Amendment, and the history of similar provider
25
lawsuits in federal courts.'
Examining the language of the Medicaid Act that provided, "[a]
State plan for medical assistance must provide ...for payment... of
the [enumerated services] ... through the use of [reasonable and
adequate] rates," the Court held that the Amendment spoke in
"mandatory rather than precatory terms,"'126 which were "wholly
uncharacteristic of a mere suggestion or 'nudge." ' 127 Furthermore, the
Court noted that the language of the Medicaid Act and its
accompanying regulations conditioned a State's receipt of federal
funds on its compliance with the Amendment. 128
While Virginia conceded that the provisions required it to make
a finding regarding the reasonable and adequate level of provider
reimbursement for various health services, provide that level of
reimbursement, and make the required assurances to the Secretary,
the State and the Secretary both argued that the good-faith
completion of these procedural requirements discharged the State's
obligation. 129 The Court rejected this argument and held that the duty
to make findings was distinct from the duty to provide assurances and
that "[i]t would make little sense for Congress to require a State to
make findings without requiring those findings to be correct," or to
require a State to submit assurances "[if] the State's findings [were
123. Id. (emphases added).
124. Id. at 509-10.

125. Id. at 512-19.
126. Id. at 512.
127. Id.
128. Id. It is curious that the Court found this fact to support an enforceable private right
under section 1983, considering Justice Rehnquist's pronouncement, in Pennhurst, that "the
typical remedy for State noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause
of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to
the State." See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
129. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512-13. Under such an interpretation, the Secretary would review
the reasonableness of the assurances, not the reasonableness of the underlying rates. Id. Any
enforceable right, therefore, would only guarantee the procedural process outlined in the
Amendment, a result that seems consistent with the wide discretion in rate setting given the
States under the Amendment. See id. at 527-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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not] reviewable in some manner by the Secretary."'130 Consequently,
by requiring a State to correctly find that its rates are reasonable and
the concomitant
adequate, the Court held that "the statute impose[d]
13 1
obligation to adopt reasonable and adequate rates."'
The Court also held that the legislative history of the
Amendment suggested that the Secretary might have the power to
enforce the reasonableness and adequacy of the rates.1 32 There was
evidence that the Amendment was enacted against a background of
provider reimbursement lawsuits, and the legislative history indicated
that Congress failed to view the Amendment as a replacement for
33
such private actions.

130. Id. at 514. While this analysis, on its face, made sense, nothing in the text of the
Amendment called for correct findings or for the Secretary's approval of those findings. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 & Supp. V) (codifying the Boren Amendment). Furthermore, the
Medicaid history the Court highlights indicates that Congress repeatedly had tried and failed to
set reimbursement rates at the national level. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 516-17. Congress passed the
Boren Amendment in order to relinquish much of the federal control over reimbursement rates.
See id. at 516. As such, the Amendment limited the Secretary's oversight to a common sense
evaluation of the assurances provided by a State that its rates were "reasonable and adequate."
See id. at 524 (holding that the State may adopt rates "that it finds are reasonable and
adequate"). In this sense, a State's rationale for its assurances must only pass a laugh test of
sorts, since only the most obviously unreasonable rates, based on patently false findings, would
be invalidated under the Amendment. While this conception of the Amendment admittedly gives
States the discretion to make bad choices in setting rates, the Court noted that the federal
government had repeatedly reached such unacceptable results itself. Id. at 515-19. In any case,
the Court failed to recognize that a congressional decision to give the States substantial
discretion in a matter directly affecting State treasuries would have been a legitimate and
understandable congressional policy choice.
131. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 514-15.
132. Id. at 515-17. 'The committee expects that the Secretary will keep the regulatory and
other requirements to the minimum necessary to assure proper accountability, and not to
overburden the States and facilities with unnecessary and burdensome paperwork
requirements." Id. at 516. "The Secretary retains final authority to review the rates and to
disapprove [them] if they do not meet the requirements of the statute." Id. Interestingly,
however, while the legislative history shows that the purpose of the statute was to obligate a
State "to pay reasonable rates," that history never expressly provides that rates are
independently reviewable outside of the assurances context, nor does it distinguish between the
"assurances" that are expressly reviewable in the statute and the rates that are not. Id. While
statutory canons are of limited use in statutory interpretation because they exist in opposing
pairs, one must always remember that statutory language is never an accident, and neither is
legislative history. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
Consider this statement by Congressman Jack Brooks of Texas, "I'll let you write the statute if
you let me write the committee report." ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 139
(1983). The fact that the statute, the regulations, and the legislative history fail to clearly
answer the question whether rates are reviewable suggests that the Court unwittingly was
forced into an interstitial enforcement role. Wilder, therefore, serves as a useful example of
legislative schizophrenia. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
schizophrenia).
133. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 516-19.
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Third, the Court considered whether a right to "reasonable
[reimbursement rates] ...adequate to meet the costs which must be
incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities" was "too
'vague and amorphous' to be judicially enforceable."' 1 34 Just like the
statute examined in Wright, the Amendment enumerated factors that
135
a State had to consider before setting reimbursement rates.
Specifically, a State had to "judge the reasonableness of its rates
against the benchmark of an efficiently.., operated facility providing
care in compliance with federal and State standards while at the same
time ensuring 'reasonable access' to eligible participants."'136 'While
there may be a range of reasonable rates," the Court recognized,
"there certainly are some rates outside that range that no State could
137
ever find to be reasonable and adequate under the Act."'
After holding that the statute created an enforceable right, the
Court looked to the statutory and administrative enforcement
provisions of the Act and found that Congress did not foreclose private
138
enforcement actions by creating a comprehensive remedial scheme.
Because the administrative remedial scheme of the Medicaid Act did
not include judicial proceedings, 139 the Court found that the scheme
failed to demonstrate Congress' implicit preclusion of private
enforcement actions under section 1983.140
Four justices vehemently dissented in Wilder, concerned that
the Court had manufactured a substantive right enforceable under
section 1983 in order that the "policy underlying the Boren
Amendment would [not] be thwarted."''
This concern, coupled with
the Court's subsequent decision in Blessing v. Freestone,142 hinted that
134. Id. at 519.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 519-20.
138. Id. at 523.
139. Medicaid's sole statutory enforcement provisions authorize the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to withhold approval of plans under section 1396(a) or reduce or eliminate
federal funding for a State plan under section 1396(c). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a), (c) (2000). It seems
that a statute must include some sort of judicial remedy if it is to be comprehensive enough to
preclude actions under section 1983. See supra note 111.
140. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 523.
141. Id. at 525 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined
the Chief Justice in his dissent. Id. at 524.
142. 520 U.S. 329 (1997). In Blessing, the Court found unenforceable under section 1983 the
child support provisions of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act because under the relevant
statute the State program needed only "substantially comply" with the requirements of the Act.
See id. at 343. Because the plaintiffs essentially asked the Court to force the director of the
State program to bring the program into substantial compliance with federal law, they in effect
asserted a private right to enforce the entirety of the Act. Id. at 341. Since the concept of
substantial compliance has an aggregate focus and is not concerned with whether the needs of
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the sources of supposed private rights might be subjected to some
heightened level of scrutiny in the future.
3. Westside Mothers v. Haveman
In Westside Mothers, the Sixth Circuit ultimately determined
that the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act conferred a private
right on beneficiaries enforceable under section 1983.143
In an
analysis spanning less than one-third of a page, the court applied the
Wilder test to the relevant statutory language. First, the court
decided that the EPSDT provisions were "clearly intended to benefit
the putative plaintiffs, children who are eligible for the screening and
treatment services," because "[i]t is well settled that Medicaid-eligible
children under the age of twenty-one are the intended beneficiaries of
144
the screening and treatment provisions."
Second, the court held that the EPSDT provisions "set a
binding obligation on [the State]," since "they are couched in
mandatory rather than precatory language, stating that Medicaid
services 'shall be furnished' to eligible children ... and that the

screening and treatment provisions 'must be provided ...' "145 Third,
the court found that the "provisions are not so vague and amorphous
as to defeat judicial enforcement, as the statute and regulations
carefully detail the specific services to be provided."1 46 Finally, the
court decided that Congress had not expressly (in a discrete statutory
provision) or implicitly (through a comprehensive remedial scheme)
precluded private actions seeking enforcement of Medicaid's EPSDT
provisions under section 1983.147
TV. A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?

When the Sixth Circuit decided Westside Mothers on May 15,
2002, the Wilder test for determining whether a statute enacted under
the spending clause conferred a right enforceable by private
any particular person have been satisfied, the Court cannot define the scope of any enforceable
right smaller than the right to enforce the statute as a whole. See id. at 341-45. The Court was
not willing or able to define the right in such a manner. See id.
143. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 863 (6th Cir. 2002); see supra notes 3-10,
73-77 and accompanying text.
144. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863. The court cited section 1396a(a)(10)(A) (providing,
"A State plan for medical assistance must provide for making medical assistance available,
including at least the care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through (5) ... of this title
[including EPSDT services], to [all eligible individuals].").
145. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863 (citing §§ 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10)(A)).
146. Id. (citing § 1396d(r)).
147. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863.
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individuals under section 1983 was relatively clear. First, the court
had to find that "the statutory section was intended to benefit the
putative plaintiff."148
Second, the statute had to set "a binding
obligation on a governmental unit," rather than merely express a
congressional preference. 149 Finally, the interests of the plaintiff must
not have been so "vague and amorphous that their enforcement would
have strained judicial competence."'150 One month later, however, the
Supreme Court changed (or, at least, finally clarified) that test in
Gonzaga University v. Doe, placing the Westside Mothers decision and
perhaps the entire Medicaid enforcement scheme in jeopardy.151
A. Unambiguously Conferred Rights: Gonzaga University v. Doe
In Gonzaga, the Court held that the Family Education Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) did not create rights enforceable under
section 1983.152 Noting, however, that its previous opinions applying
section 1983 to spending clause legislation were not "models of
clarity," the Court decided to use Gonzaga to "resolve any ambiguity"
in this area, giving the opinion importance far beyond its immediate
context.153 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reiterated,
"[i]n legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical
remedy for State noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is
not a private cause of action... but rather action by the federal
government to terminate funds to the State."'1 54 This principle allowed
the Court to narrow what it characterized as an erroneous and
"relatively loose standard for finding rights enforceable by [section]
1983."155
The key inquiry, the Court emphasized, is whether Congress
has spoken "with a clear voice" manifesting an "unambiguous intent to
confer individual rights."'156 This requires more than a mere showing
148. Id. at 862 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)).
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002).
152. Id. at 276. The statute at issue provided in relevant part, "No funds shall be made
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a
policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any personally identifiable information in
educational records other than directory information ...

unless ...

there is written consent from

the student's parents specifying records to be released, the reasons for such release, and to
whom, and with a copy of the records to be released to the student's parents and the student if
desired by the parents." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(A) (2000).
153. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 278.
154. Id. at 280 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)).
155. Id. at 282.
156. Id. at 280.
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that Congress intended to "benefit" the putative plaintiff, since "[t]o
seek redress through [section] 1983, a plaintiff must assert the
1 57
violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law."'
Without such "specific, individually enforceable rights, there [is] no
basis for private enforcement, even by a class of the statute's principal
beneficiaries." 158
Section 1983 "merely provides a mechanism for
enforcing individual rights 'secured' elsewhere,
i.e., rights
independently 'secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United
159
States."
This clarified standard is strikingly similar to the Court's
reasoning in implied right of action cases. 16 0 In both contexts a court
must determine whether the statute in question creates a federal
right, as opposed to a mere benefit or interest. 16 1 The Court's implied
right of action cases, therefore, "should guide the determination of
whether a statute confers rights enforceable under [section] 1983."162
According to these cases, "[t]he question whether Congress ...
intended to create a private right of action [is] definitively answered in
the negative" where "a statute by its terms grants no private rights to
any identifiable class."'163 In other words, a statute creating private
164
rights must be "phrased in terms of the persons benefited."'
Applying this test, the Court has held that Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 implicitly confer enforceable
individual rights. 165 Conversely, the Court has refused to recognize

157. Id. at 282 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)).
158. Id. at 281 (quoting Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992)).
159. Id. at 285. "[O]ne cannot go into court and claim a violation of [section] 1983 [since
section] 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
160. An implied right of action allows a private plaintiff to sue for injunctive relief or
damages for the violation of a federal statute even though the statute itself does not expressly
provide for such a remedy. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80 (2001). A court
must determine whether an implied right of action exists by examining the statutory text. See
id. at 289.
161. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 283-84 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979)).
164. Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
165. Id.; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13. Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2000). Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides, "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
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such implied rights under statutes that "create duties ... for the
benefit of the public at large."' 166 Once a court finds an enforceable
right, the two approaches diverge. In the implied right of action
context, a plaintiff must further prove that Congress intended to
create a private statutory remedy. In contrast, section 1983 supplies a
general remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal
statutes. 167
After the Gonzaga court clearly identified the burden that a
section 1983 plaintiff must carry, it examined FERPA's statutory
text. 68 First, the Court found that FERPA's provisions "entirely lack
the sort of 'rights-creating' language critical to showing the requisite
congressional intent to create new rights."16 9 FERPA's provision that
"[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to
any educational agency or institution" is a directive to the Secretary of
Education, not a statement creating a private right. 170 Second, the

provides, 'To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not denied or
abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal,
State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device [not approved
under section 5 of the Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000). The original, pre-enactment versions of
these statutes were phrased not in terms of the persons benefited, but as directives to federal
agencies. Title IX originally provided, "The Secretary shall not make any... payment.., nor
shall the Secretary enter into any contract with an institution of higher education.., unless the
application, contract, or other arrangement ...
contains assurances... that any such
institution.., will not discriminate on the basis of sex .... " 117 Cong. Rec. 30, 411 (1971)
(emphases added). Title VI originally provided, "[No... financial assistance shall be furnished
in circumstances under which individuals participating in or benefiting from the program or
activity are discriminated against on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." S.
1731, 88th Cong. (1963) (emphasis added). Congress drastically changed the language of these
statutes prior to enactment because, as originally drafted, the statutes "did not authorize a
private remedy for a person against whom discrimination had been practiced." See Hearingon S.
1731 and S. 1750 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,88th Cong., 334-335, 349-352 (1963);
see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 n.14.
166. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13; see also T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 46970 (1959) (holding that the sections of the Motor Carrier Act that provide it shall be the duty of
interstate motor carriers to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates, charges,
and classifications, and further provide that all charges made for any service rendered by such
carriers shall be just and reasonable, do not create a judicially enforceable right in a shipper to
be free from exaction of unreasonable charges as to past shipments); Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v.
Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) (holding that the provision in Federal
Power Act requiring reasonable electric utility rates is a standard for the Federal Power
Commission to apply and, independently of Commission action, creates no right which courts
may enforce).
167. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284.
168. For a discussion of the statutory text, see supra note 152.
169. Gonzaga, 536 U.S.at 287.
170. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000). As the Court in Cannon stated, 'There would be far less
reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress ... had written [Title
IX] simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds." 441 U.S. at 690-
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Court found that FERPA's provisions speak "only in terms of
institutional policy and practice, not individual instances of
disclosure. 71 As such, FERPA has an aggregate focus, indicating that
the statute is not concerned with "whether the needs of any given
person have been satisfied." 172 Futhermore, the Court noted that an
institution does not violate FERPA so long as the institution
substantially complies with FERPA's requirements. 173
FERPA's
standard of substantial compliance, which requires the Secretary of
Education to use his independent judgment in determining whether
an institution is in violation of the Act, was strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to provide students or their parents with a
private right of action under section 1983.174
Finally, the Court found that FERPA's enforcement mechanism
supported its conclusion that FERPA does not provide a private right
of action. 175 FERPA directs the Secretary of Education to deal with
violations by creating a review board for investigating and
adjudicating violations of the statute. 176 Pursuant to this directive,
the Secretary promulgated administrative regulations that allow
aggrieved students or their parents to file complaints with
administrative officials. 177 Such a complaint, however, does not entitle
the parent or student to any individual remedy even if a violation of
FERPA is found as a result of the investigation instigated by the
complaint.17 8 Instead, when the Secretary decides that an institution
has violated FERPA he sends that institution instructions as to how it
may correct the violation. 179 If the institution fails to correct the
violation to the Secretary's satisfaction, the institution becomes
ineligible to receive federal funding.18 0 By blurring the discrete prongs
of the Wright and Wilder tests, the Court broadened the scope of

171. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288 (noting that FERPA prohibits the funding of an institution
only when the institution has "a policy or practice of permitting the release of education
records").
172. Id.
173. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1234c(a) (2000).
174. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288.
175. Id. at 289-90.
176. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f)-(g) (2000).
177. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.63 (2002).
178. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 278-79, 287-290. While the complaint may eventually force
the violating institution to comply with FERPA's privacy requirements or forego federal funding,
the complaining student receives neither a curative remedy nor damages as compensation for the
release of his academic information. Id. at 289-91.
179. See § 99.66(b), (c)(1).
180. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)-(2).
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inquiry and made it more difficult for a plaintiff to prove the existence
of an alleged statutory right enforceable under section 1983.
B: Why Medicaid Should Be Interpretedas Not ConferringEnforceable
Rights
It is extremely unlikely that the Westside Mothers opinion
could survive scrutiny under the Gonzaga standard, as the logic of
Westside Mothers depends primarily on the Sixth Circuit's
determination that Medicaid-eligible children are the beneficiaries of
Medicaid's EPSDT provisions.18 1 It is true that the Medicaid Act
benefits eligible children by allocating federal funds to enable States
to provide for the medical needs of such children.18 2 However, the
Gonzaga standard requires more than a mere showing that the
statute is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff to support a claim
under section 1983.183
The standard requires that the statute
unambiguously create an enforceable private right in the
beneficiary.184
The Medicaid Act lacks the language necessary to create an
enforceable private right. Since section 1983 "merely provides a
mechanism for enforcing individual rights 'secured' elsewhere" by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, the Court should not allow
181. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 863 (6th Cir. 2002). A determination that
the EPSDT provisions were intended to benefit these children was enough, in the opinion of the
Sixth Circuit, to satisfy the first prong of the Wilder test. See id. The Wilder opinion is discussed
in detail above. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
182. The relevant language provides,
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State,
to furnish medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children ...whose income
and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, ....
there is hereby
authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of
this subchapter. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments
to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for medical
assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
The term 'medical assistance' means payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and
services..

. for individuals ... who are ...

under the age of 21, or, at the option of the State,

under the age of 20, 19, or 18 as the State may choose, but whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet all of such cost--early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment
services (as defined in subsection (r) of this section) for individuals who are eligible under the
plan and are under the age of 21 ....

§ 1396d(a)(i), (a)(4)(B). "A State plan for medical assistance must provide for making medical
assistance available, including at least the care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through
(5) ...of Section 1396d(a) of this title [including EPSDT services] to [Medicaid-eligible children].
§ 1396a(10)(A).
183. See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
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a section 1983 claim unless Congress, in the statute at issue, has
spoken with a clear voice manifesting an "unambiguous intent to
confer individual rights." 18 5 Like the FERPA provisions that the
Court examined in Gonzaga, the Medicaid Act does not contain the
rights-creating
language "critical to showing the requisite
18 6
congressional intent to create new rights."
A statute creating enforceable rights must be "phrased in
terms of the persons benefited." 18 7 The Medicaid Act, however,
consists of directives to the federal government,18 8 the Secretary of
Health and Human Services,18 9 and, perhaps, State officials designing
and administering a Medicaid program.1 90
Since the Court has
repeatedly held that it will interpret any single part of a statute in
relation to, and in harmony with, the text and purpose of the statute
as a whole, it is instructive to examine the various Medicaid
provisions relevant to a Gonzaga analysis of the Westside Mothers
case. 191
The appropriations section of the Act, for example, illustrates
the Act's failure to confer enforceable rights. According to that
section, the Act's purpose is to enable "each State, as far as practicable
under the conditions in each State, to furnish" medical services to the
poor.192 A direct comparison between the aforementioned civil rights
185. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002).
186. Id. at 287.
187. Id. at 284.
188. See, e.g., § 1396 (providing, "[T]here is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each
fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this subchapter").
189. See, e.g., § 1396c(2) (providing, "[Tlhe Secretary shall notify the State agency that
further payments will not be made to the State ....
").
190. See, e.g., § 1396a (providing, "A State plan for medical assistance must provide..
The statutes at issue in Westside Mothers fall into this latter category of directives to State
officials. See 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002). These Medicaid directives are not a proper source
from which to fashion individual rights because they "focus on the person regulated rather than
the individuals protected" and therefore "create no implication of an intent to confer rights on a
particular class of persons." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001).
191. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown-Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000); Holloway v. United
States, 526 U.S. 1, 9 (1999); United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
192. § 1396 (emphasis added). One can envision Chief Justice Rehnquist seizing on this
language and invoking an argument similar to the one he expressed in his concurring opinion to
The Benzene Case, where he interpreted the language "to the extent feasible" in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 6(b)(5) (2000); Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (commonly known as The Benzene Case). He
wrote then that the language "to the extent feasible" in that statute rendered "what had been a
clear, if somewhat unrealistic, standard largely, if not entirely, precatory." Indus. Union Dept.,
448 U.S. at 681-82. It is difficult for this author to distinguish the words "as far as is
practicable" from the words "to the extent feasible." Additionally, the original version of the
Medicaid Act passed by the Senate placed the words "as far as practicable under the conditions
in each State" in parentheses. 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N 1943, 2144. The version appearing in the
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statutes 193 and the Medicaid Act exposes the precatory character of
this language.
Such a comparison is particularly instructive
considering that Congress enacted Medicaid during the same period in
which it passed these landmark civil rights laws. 194 For example, one
cannot imagine Congress enacting legislation providing, "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin.., be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance as far as practicable under the
conditions in each State. 195 The Medicaid Act contains no language
even approximating that of the contemporaneously enacted civil rights
1 96
statutes that the Court has held to confer enforceable private rights.
The Medicaid Act is also unable to support a claim under
section 1983 because its provisions speak "only in terms of
institutional policy and practice" and not in terms of the provision of
care to any individual. 197 While the EPSDT provisions do generally
operate for the benefit of eligible children, 9 8 when a State's Medicaid
compliance is in question, the focus of the Secretary's inquiry is on the
plan or the administration of the plan, not on individual instances of
noncompliance.199 Medicaid, like FERPA, has an aggregate focus,

United States Code sets off these words with commas. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). One cannot read
either version and fail to notice the importance of these words. The change from parentheses to
commas indicates that these words were not mere rhetorical flourish but were important enough
to survive some sort of editing process prior to their inclusion in the United States Code.
193. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. These civil rights statutes are The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, The Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Education Amendments of 1972.
194. These civil rights statutes were enacted in 1964, 1965, and 1972. See supra note 165.
Medicaid was enacted in 1965. See supra note 15.
195. Such a construction is particularly ridiculous considering that the purpose of federal
civil rights laws has been to place certain rights "beyond hazard" of State interference. See infra
note 209. Instead of adapting to the conditions in each State, federal statutory rights aim at
changing the conditions in each State. In no case can the very nature of the right itself change
from State to State. Such inconsistency in application, however, is inherent in the operative
language of the Medicaid Act.
196. See upra note 165.
197. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) (2000) ("The term "medical assistance" means payment of
part or all of the cost of the following care and services ...

to individuals ...

who are under the

age of 21, or, at the option of the State, under the age of 20, 19, or 18 as the State may choose...
but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all of such cost ... early and periodic
screening, diagnostic, and treatment services (as defined in subsection (r) of this section) for
individuals who are eligible under the plan and are under the age of 21 .... ").
199. See, e.g., § 1396a ("A State plan for medical assistance must provide ... ") (emphasis
added). The statute does not read, "the State must provide to eligible children .... ," or read, "no
eligible child shall be denied ....
§ 1396c(1)-(2) ("If the Secretary... finds that the plan has
been changed so that it no longer complies ... or that in the administrationof the plan there is a
failure to comply..." (emphases added)).
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indicating that the statute is not concerned with "whether the needs of
'20 0
any given person have been satisfied.
Additionally, the requirements of the Medicaid Act are met so
long as a State's plan and the State's administration of its plan
substantially comply with those requirements. 20 1 The possibility of
substantial compliance supported the Gonzaga Court's determination
that FERPA did not confer enforceable rights, since the determination
whether there had been substantial compliance was left to the sound
discretion of the Secretary of Education. 20 2 Similarly, the decision of
whether or not there has been substantial compliance with Medicaid
provisions rests solely within the discretion of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services. 20 3 A loose standard of substantial compliance is
clearly at odds with the idea of a judicially enforceable private right
since the standard gives potential defendants little guidance on how
they should regulate their conduct to avoid litigation and judicially
20 4
imposed liability.
Finally, the Medicaid Act's existing statutory enforcement
scheme clearly does not contemplate private causes of action under
section 1983.
While States do provide internal administrative
hearings for those who feel that they have wrongfully been denied
care, the sole external enforcement mechanism is the termination or
reduction of federal payments to States failing to comply substantially
with Medicaid provisions. 20 5 Most importantly, the Medicaid Act
200. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288.
201. See § 1396c(2) (providing that the Secretary may stop Medicaid payments to a State if,
in the administration of the State's Medicaid plan, there is a failure "to comply substantially"
with Medicaid provisions).
202. § 1234c(a); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288.
203. § 1396c(2); see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997) ("Far from creating
an individual entitlement to services, the [substantial compliance] standard is simply a
yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of [the] program. Thus, the
Secretary must look to the aggregate services provided by the State, not to whether the needs of
any particular person have been satisfied.") Additionally, where a Medicaid plan fails to
substantially comply with statutory and regulatory provisions because it is poorly designed, as
the plaintiffs in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 856 (6th Cir. 2002), allege, a
challenge based on that alleged fact "invite[s] the District Court to oversee every aspect" of the
program, a task which clearly is beyond the competence of the judiciary and uniquely suited to
administrative oversight. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341.
204. Justice Cardozo eloquently described the uselessness of such a legal system when he
stated, "Law as a guide to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility if it is unknown and
unknowable." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924). Professor Jeremy
Bentham famously compared such ad hoc legal decision making to dog training: "When your dog
does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it."
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE TRUTH VERSUS ASHHURST; OR, LAW AS IT IS, CONTRASTED WITH WHAT IT
IS SAID To BE, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 231, 235 (1792).

205. The State of Michigan, for example, required every Medicaid provider to "incorporate an
internal administrative grievance procedure as a condition of its contract with the State."
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empowers the Secretary to restore payments to a State plan when he
20 6
is "satisfied that there will no longer be any such failure to comply."
The Secretary's wide discretion suggests a congressional intent to
foreclose private remedies under section 1983.207
The foregoing discussion has focused on demonstrating why the
plain language of the Medicaid Act does not create private rights
within the meaning of section 1983. The plain language of section
1983, however, presents its own vexing problem. Section 1983, by its
terms, is merely a mechanism for the enforcement of individual rights
that are secured elsewhere. 20 8 Section 1983's use of the word "secured"
renders it wholly inapplicable to the Medicaid Act.
The district court in Westside Mothers engaged in an analysis
of the term "secured" and held, in the context of section 1983, that "to
20 9
secure" meant "to put beyond hazard of losing or of not receiving."
The court further held that a meaningful synonym was the word
"guarantee," as in "guarantee the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity." 210 If "secure" is given its plain meaning, section 1983
cannot be used to remedy violations of the Medicaid Act, since the
Medicaid Act, as an exercise of the spending power, guarantees
21 1
nothing.
The Medicaid Act has no effect in a State until that State
implements a health care plan meeting Medicaid requirements and
accepts federal funds. 212 Until both requirements are met, the
otherwise Medicaid-eligible citizens of a State have no guarantee that
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. Mich. 2001). While courts that
have addressed the issue of administrative appeal proceedings have held that the presence of
such procedures does not indicate a congressional intent to foreclose a private remedy through a
comprehensive remedial structure, those cases involved an inquiry in which the court already
had found a right to exist. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-512, 521 (1990);
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 424 (1987); Westside Mothers,
289 F.3d at 863.
206. § 1396c(2).
207. Even if a plaintiff were somehow able to coherently articulate a private "right" to force
State compliance with the Medicaid Act, the fact remains that Congress defined the right only in
terms of the personal satisfaction of an extra-judicial enforcement officer. Id. As a practical
matter, such a right is in reality not defined at all, making it unenforceable by a court in a
private enforcement action that does not directly challenge the Secretary's discretion.
208. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)); accord Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989). The actual text of section 1983 provides a cause of action against any
person who under color of State law deprives an individual of "any right, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)
(emphasis added).
209. Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 582.
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they will receive anything under the federal statute. 213 Even if the
subsequent accrual of benefits to eligible individuals is characterized
by the State as a right, privilege, or immunity, these benefits are not
secured within the meaning of section 1983 because the State could
alter or end its participation in the Medicaid program at any time. 2 14
Medicaid, like all legislation enacted under the spending clause, has
at best a tenuous relationship with section 1983.215
V. LIFE AFTER SECTION 1983: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
Medicaid as it currently exists simply cannot support a private
right to health care enforceable under section 1983. This result is
simultaneously intellectually satisfying and socially troubling. While
States freed from the financial uncertainties of private lawsuits could
more aggressively restrain costs in the face of their current fiscal
crisis, Medicaid beneficiaries would have no recourse if State officials
wrongfully denied them benefits. Importantly, the Supreme Court has
not yet spoken conclusively on the issue, giving Congress a rare
opportunity to proactively reform the Medicaid program.
Congress could expressly authorize private plaintiffs to enforce
the Medicaid Act against the States in one of three ways. First, it
could amend the Medicaid statute to explicitly and unambiguously
confer enforceable private rights. 21 6 Second, it could force the States
to voluntarily abrogate their sovereign immunity as a condition of
participating in the Medicaid program. 2 17 Finally, Congress could
create a comprehensive enforcement scheme within the federal
government that is accessible by beneficiaries. 21 8
Each of these
congressional actions would likely establish some sort of an
enforceable right to health care under Medicaid. Unfortunately, the

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981); see also
supranotes 92-96 and accompanying text.
216. Congress could, for example, merely reword sections of the Medicaid Act to mirror the
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or similar statutes.
217. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). It is interesting
to note that Congress attempted this requirement in the limited context of provider
reimbursement claims under Pub. L. No. 94-182, § 111, 89 Stat. 1054 (1975) but repealed the law
one year later after strong opposition and outcry from States. See Pub. L. No. 94-552, 90 Stat.
2540 (1976).
218. Such a scheme probably would have to provide its own level of judicial review, however,
in order to preclude section 1983 actions. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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economic reality of the current Medicaid program demonstrates that
219
the United States simply cannot afford such a right.
If the underlying economic dimension of the Medicaid program,
and of public health care generally, is to be addressed in a principled
fashion, Congress cannot continue to externalize political costs at the
Instead, Congress must implement disciplined
public expense.
Medicaid reforms that address the causes, rather than the symptoms,
of the system's failure.
A. The Good: Gonzaga Could Provide the States with Much-Needed
Fiscal Relief
The cost of Medicaid is staggering. Medicaid's cooperative
financial structure has led to double-digit growth of the program in
almost every year since its inception. 220 The cost of Medicaid has risen
dramatically, from $770 million in its first year 221 to over $270 billion
223
today. 222 Medicaid expenditures grew by over 11% in 2001 alone.
Designed as a health care safety net for the deserving poor, Medicaid
has reached proportions never imagined by its creators. On average,
Medicaid spending now accounts for approximately 20% of all State
225
budgets, 22 4 ranking second only to education.
A recent study by the National Health Policy Forum indicated
that nearly every State is experiencing a financial crisis. 226 Medicaid
expenditures are a major cause of these budgetary troubles. In 2001,

219. Bill Frist, Runaway Medicaid, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at A18 (arguing that
"nobody can responsibly argue against the fiscal necessity of reducing the growth rate of the
[Medicaid] program"). This Note suggests that the elimination of private enforcement actions is
a necessary part of any effort to reduce Medicaid's rate of expansion. See infra notes 239-242
and accompanying text.
220. See Frist, supra note 219.
221. Id.

222. Robert Pear, Governors Resist Bush Plan to Slow Costs of Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2003, at 1-1.
223. Pear, supranote 2.
224. Richard Wolf, Medicaid Outcome Will Affect All, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1996, at A10; see
also Pear & Toner, supra note 2.
225. Pear, supra note 2.
226. RANDY DESONIA, RUNNING ON EMPTY: THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS WORSENS 5 (Nat'l
Health Policy Forum, Issue Brief No. 783, 2002), available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfsjib/
IB783%5FState%5FBudgets%5F9%2D25%2DO2%2Epdf (last visited July 31, 2003). Kansas
faces a $108 million shortfall in 2003. Id. at 2. In South Carolina, the number is $331 million,
and in Maryland, a staggering $1.3 billion. Id. Rhode Island has slashed all agency budgets by
eight percent (8%). Id. By August 2002, Georgia had experienced its fourteenth straight month
of declining tax revenues and fee collections. Id. In all, State deficits are expected to reach $26
billion in 2003 alone. See Calmes, supra note 26. Nearly every State now sees Medicaid as an
overgrown program in need of slimming. See DESONIA, supra,at 8-9, 11-13.

20031

TWO WRONGS DON'T MAKE A RIGHT

1515

for example, Medicaid expenditures exceeded budgeted amounts in 37
227
States.
The Gonzaga decision may be just what the States need to
remedy their financial crisis. States freed from the specter of private
lawsuits could act more aggressively to streamline Medicaid
programs. Each State would have more freedom to work with the
Department of Health and Human Services in an attempt to balance
the costs and benefits of its Medicaid program. The Department
would naturally be hesitant to find a State's program insufficient,
since the resulting withdrawal of FFP would only harm those that the
Medicaid Act was designed to help. A Medicaid system without
enforceable private rights would more closely resemble the program
envisioned by its authors, who wished to enable "each State, as far as
practicable under the conditions in each State, to furnish [medical
services to the poor]."228
Some commentators cringe at the thought of allowing the
States more latitude with regard to the specifics of their Medicaid
programs, but their concerns are unfounded and fail to address the
economic and social realities of modern medicine. 229 First, the States
are deeply concerned with the health of their citizens, and while
States may require federal funds to help them achieve their public
health goals, they do not need Congress to tell them what those goals
should be. 230 Second, the Medicaid Act was not designed to provide all
desired care to all needy people. It was designed to help fulfill State

227. See Pear & Toner, supra note 2.
227.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
229. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, The "New Federalism" Approach to Medicaid:
Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently FederalAuthority to the States Harms Public Health,
90 KY. L.J. 973, 989 (2002) (asking, "Are the [SItates committed and capable of executing the
responsibility of financing health care for the poor even with substantial federal assistance, and
are resulting disparities in the treatment of protected groups by [SItates tolerable?").
230. Jeffrey A. Modisett, Discovering the Impact of "New Federalism"on State Policy Matters:
A State Attorney General's Perspective, 32 IND. L. REV. 141, 141 (1998) (arguing that
policymakers are "rethinking the presumption that national problems require a solution
initiated or controlled by the federal government"). Attorney General Modisett observes that
while "the influence of the federal government over matters traditionally within state purview
has marked the post-New Deal era," especially in the areas of criminal law, labor relations, civil
rights, and environmental law, "States are [now] taking the initiative to analyze and attempt to
solve problems that the federal government has declined to address. Id. at 151-52. By way of
example, Modisett notes that "welfare reform as a concrete plan of action-as opposed to a vague
attack on liberalism-finds its antecedents in several state experiments." Id. at 152. Further,
"it is the state tobacco litigation that provides the best example of state-initiated reform
achieving national results." Id.
'This trend is a challenge to states, especially "smallgovernment" states... to find the best solutions for these problems that our national
government has been unable to solve. Id. at 144.
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health care priorities, to the extent practicable in each State.23 1
Consequently, the mere existence of a disparity between State and
Federal public health care priorities does not require the imposition a
unitary federal public health policy. If Congress has additional health
care priorities, Congress should fund those priorities directly, outside
of the Medicaid program, rather than abdicate its responsibilities to
the courts.
Third, health care is a business, and as such there232 are
If
economic dimensions to every treatment and coverage decision.
judicial action were limited, the citizens of each State would have to
focus their health care reform efforts on legislators rather than on
judges. The increased political activity, conducted in a public forum,
would provide citizens and legislators with a better opportunity to
accurately define the level of public health for which they are willing
to pay. 233 Presumably, such preferences would be embodied in State
laws. Congress, in turn, could see more clearly the differences
between State and federal health care priorities and allocate scarce
resources more efficiently. Most importantly, the ensuing public
debate over additional funding and the socially acceptable scope of
services would restore political accountability to the Medicaid
program.
B. The Bad: Individual Instances of Noncompliance Could Be
Catastrophicfor Beneficiaries
Medicaid itself does not provide for a private right of action,
and the Court has held that no implied right of action exists. 234 The
complete preclusion of section 1983 actions could create a significant
bar to enforcement in certain rare situations where a private
enforcement action is the only means to compel the provision of
wrongfully denied care. 235 Depending on the nature of the services
231. See § 1396.
232. Blumstein, supra note 43.
233. This dialogue is one possible use for the Citizens' Health Care Working Group proposed
by Senators Wyden and Hatch. See supranote 1 and accompanying text.
234. Michael A. Platt, Note, Westside Mothers and Medicaid: Will This Mean the End of
Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Using Section 1983?, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 273,
284 (2001).
235. Medicaid contains two primary enforcement mechanisms. At the systemic level, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services can compel compliance by threatening to withdraw
Medicaid funding. See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text. At the individual level, each
State is required to implement an internal appeals procedure through which a beneficiary can
challenge a denial of care. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. The extraordinary
situation contemplated here is one in which there is a discrete denial of care, a wrongful rejection
of the Medicaid beneficiary's appeal, and the possibility that the beneficiary could wait for
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involved, a wrongful denial of care could result in a medical and
human tragedy. The challenge is to develop a public health system
that properly allocates scarce economic resources while avoiding tragic
denials of necessary care.
Severe injuries or deaths resulting from the denial of medical
care, also known as tragic choices, focus public attention on an issue in
a way that rhetoric and abstract discussion cannot.23 6 If politicians
and voters are to reduce public health care costs in any meaningful
way, however, occasional tragic choices are inevitable. 237 Health care
resources are finite and no program can provide every beneficiary with
all the care that he or she wants. Realistic Medicaid reformers must
ask, "What level of tragedy should an enlightened and compassionate
society accept in the face of the economic realities of public health
care?"
Since the socially acceptable minimum level of public health
care is probably that which provides the most protection against tragic
choices for the most people, each beneficiary of a public health
program must be willing to sacrifice some measure of health care for
the overall good. 2 38 The resulting level of public health resembles the
standard of adequacy contemplated by managed care. Section 1983
actions and legislative schizophrenia largely thwart attempts to push
this unpleasant issue into the arena of reasoned public debate. 23 9 If,
through principled public debate over the cost of health care, the
public's expectations with regard to public health care could be aligned
more closely with the public's willingness to pay for that care, the
required baseline of public health care would shift. The States and
the federal government would then be able to openly and prospectively
allocate the resources necessary to achieve the popularly dictated level
of public care. In such a fully funded and politically and economically
accountable public health care system, the need for private
treatment until the resolution of his case in the federal courts. Such a situation would not
trigger systemic review under the aggregate focus the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
and the preclusion of private enforcement actions would prevent the beneficiary from seeking a
remedy.
236. The term "tragic choice" refers to the situation where beneficial or life-saving treatment
exists for a patient's condition but the government or another financially responsible entity is
unable or unwilling to commit the resources necessary for the provision of that treatment,
resulting in the serious injury to, or death of, the patient. See Muse v. Charter Hosp. of WinstonSalem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 589 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); see also HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33,
at 6-7.
237. See Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 589 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995); see also HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33, at 6-7.
238. Robert Gavin, Cutting Benefits for Some Can Mean Extending Coverage to Others, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at B8..

239. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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enforcement actions would necessarily decrease. 240 The preclusion of
section 1983 enforcement actions, therefore, could actually help to
eliminate the need for such actions by keeping the discussion of public
health care priorities in the democratic process where it belongs.
Importantly, the level of public health for which the public is
willing and able to pay is a flexible concept. It is entirely possible, and
indeed likely, that an informed public would want to provide as much
care as possible for Medicaid-eligible children. As such, the public
could direct lawmakers to allocate the resources necessary to pay for
that care. This funding priority would likely necessitate a reduction
241
in the level of care provided to other Medicaid-eligible individuals.
For example, the elderly might find themselves facing decreased
public health services. 242 It is also possible that the public would
decide to fully fund public health care programs at the expense of
other budgetary items or through higher taxes. Perhaps some citizens
view public health as more important than education or national
defense. Regardless, the point is that citizens, not courts, should
weigh the costs and benefits of public health decisions.
C. The Not-So- Ugly: A ProactiveApproach to Medicaid Reform
The Gonzaga decision gives political actors a rare opportunity
to make proactive changes in the cooperative Medicaid scheme and
avoid the consequences of a sudden change in the Act's enforcement
mechanism. By gradually addressing the funding, coverage, and
enforcement issues that prevent the Medicaid program from providing
adequate care to all eligible citizens, society as a whole can capture
the benefits of an economically balanced health care system without
harming those individuals that the program was designed to protect.
While a comprehensive solution to the Medicaid funding problem will
be incredibly complex, several key issues must figure into any reforms.
First, Congress must provide States with the funding that they
need to substantially comply with current Medicaid standards. While
Congress will have to risk political accountability in order to do so,
240. This is not an extraordinary observation, but it is an important one. This Note does not
suggest that each Medicaid beneficiary will suddenly acquire a selfless desire to sacrifice some
small measure of his own medical security for the good of the whole, nor does it suggest that
welfare rights groups will cease vigorously advocating for their special interests. In a fully
funded and clearly articulated public health care system made possible in part by the increased
political dialogue resulting from the elimination of private enforcement actions, however,
questions of individual non-compliance will be resolved through administrative appeals and
requests for systemic reforms will be addressed to the proper political officials.
241. See Gavin, supra note 227.
242. Id.
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political accountability is an important check on runaway Medicaid
24 3
spending that enables the program to function properly.
Second, Congress must both clarify the Medicaid enforcement
scheme and phase out private enforcement actions under section 1983.
Any Medicaid reform effort will fail without the uniformity of
treatment and the policy-making expertise that only a wholly
administrative enforcement scheme can provide. A gradual move
away from private enforcement will reduce the impact of this change
in the short term, when the risk of tragic choices will be the highest.
Third, Congress and the States need to engage in open dialogue
about a feasible scope of coverage for the Medicaid program. The
current system pits the States against Congress in a battle to
maximize political gain and externalize political cost. 244 Such an
arrangement ignores Medicaid's cooperative purpose in which the
States and the federal government are supposed to work together for
the benefit of vulnerable citizens. 245 State governments are fully
capable of identifying the health care priorities of their citizens, and
Medicaid was designed to help them fulfill those priorities. 246 One
alternative that recognizes this reality would require the federal
government to directly and fully fund certain health care priorities
enumerated in the Medicaid statute. The federal government could
then use Medicaid FFP as a means of encouraging States to exceed
24 7
this level of care.
Fourth, the most important change that must be made to the
Medicaid statute is the establishment of bright-line health care
priorities. Since society cannot pay for all the health care that all the
people want, there must be some objective method to determine what
society should provide. This will be the most painful part of the
reform process but citizens must fully understand the economic
consequences of their health care choices.
The enemy of any attempt to clearly define the scope of a
health care program is the concept of medical necessity. It may seem

243. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
246. Id.
247. An amended statute could serve as an affirmative statement of federal health care
priorities rather than a baseline of care below which a State incurs liability or administrative
sanctions. Perhaps the federal government should pay for all care up to this "ceiling" and then
allow the States to supplement the health care of their poor citizens to the extent possible. The
federal priorities undoubtedly would include services for children under a reworked EPSDT
provision, but such services probably would be streamlined. Under such a system, citizens would
be better able to bring political forces to bear on health care issues because they would know
whether to direct their efforts toward the federal government or State officials in any given case.
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obvious that a physician would only prescribe treatment that is
medically necessary, but the use of this term carries significance far
beyond the truism that unnecessary or harmful care should be
avoided. 248 The real problem with the use of the term "medical
necessity" in the Medicaid statute (or any other medical coverage
context) is that the term has an inherent meaning independent of any
contractual or statutory definition. 249 This meaning, derived solely
from the professional standards of the medical community, effectively
requires the provision of all beneficial care without regard to the
marginal cost of that care. 250 This conception of medical necessity
eliminates the cost-benefit analysis that is vital to any efficient health
251
care model.
The concept of medical necessity must be removed from the
Medicaid statute if Congress is to adopt bright lines of health
coverage. The task of creating such bright lines will most likely result
in a pair of lists: one for covered services and one for services not
covered. 25 2 Additionally, there may be a desire to cover certain
services in some circumstances but not in others, subject to the
requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act 253 and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,254 both of which limit the circumstances
under which differences in the provision of medical services are
permitted.
Finally, all Medicaid funding must contemplate the cost-saving
characteristics of managed care. The big question is "not whether, but
248. See Blumstein, supra note 43.
249. See Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Blumstein, supra note 43.
250. Hughes, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 845; see also HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33, at 1228-29;
Blumstein, supra note 43.
251. See Blumstein, supra note 43.
252. In this respect, the result could resemble the original conception of Oregon's Basic
Health Services Act. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33, at 105-07; see generally James F.
Blumstein, The Oregon Experiment: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Allocation of
Medical Funds, 45 SOC. Sc. & MED. 545 (1997) (discussing the Oregon plan in detail and
highlighting the political, social, and legal challenges associated with the operation of such a
public health care system).
253. See §§ 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(7)-(8) (2000) (preamble and purposes of the ADA). Certain
interpretations of the ADA might prevent cost effectiveness by precluding a treating physician's
ability to refuse to administer "futile" treatment. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.
Va. 1993). But see Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism,Exoticare, and Coerced Altruism: The ADA
Meets its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 889-90 (1995) (arguing that the ADA should not be
interpreted as requiring futile or exotic care at the public expense).
254. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-718b. Denial of care violates the Rehabilitation Act only if the plaintiff
is a "handicapped individual" under the Act, "otherwise qualified" for the benefit sought, and is
denied care solely because of his handicap, and if the program or activity denying the care
receives federal financial assistance. See Johnson ex rel Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487,
1492 (10th Cir. 1992).
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how, to make managed care serve the needs of the Medicaid
population." 255 Managed care is necessary because Medicaid is
publicly funded and susceptible to the moral hazard of over utilization
by beneficiaries. Congress should provide funding on a prospective
payment basis and assume that each State program will be
administered through an MCO in order to maximize the purchasing
256
power of every health care dollar.
VI. CONCLUSION

After Gonzaga, it appears clear that the language of the
Medicaid Act does not support an enforceable private right to
Medicaid services under section 1983. The logic of the Westside
Mothers decision and of similar private enforcement actions, therefore,
is potentially invalid. Some commentators fear that such a result will
hinder progress toward the goal of providing health care to all who
need it. Gonzaga, however, may ultimately encourage principled and
responsible political debate on the topic of Medicaid reform by
preventing Congress from relying on private plaintiffs to enforce
precatory federal health priorities against the States.
If Congress is to proactively and seriously address the impact
of Gonzaga, it must also examine the causes and effects of decades of
runaway health care spending as well as the economic impact of a
health care delivery model limited at the bottom but not at the top. A
serious look at the economic realities of public health care will require
belt-tightening and soul-searching by State and federal officials as
well as a basic change of attitude and a new health care vocabulary.
Current political rhetoric about providing each citizen with all
the health care that he needs addresses the normative and ethical
dimensions of health care but ignores the critical economic
consequences of a supposed right to health care. 257 Health care
resources are finite while demand for health care is potentially
infinite. Rationing of services, in the form of managed care decisions
contemplating a standard of adequacy, must occur now and in the
future.

255. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33, at 285.
256. Prospective payment systems are akin to capitation payments in that payment amounts
for specific services are fixed in advance and designed to encourage providers to the weigh the
costs and benefits of various treatment options. See id. at 228. President George W. Bush
recently proposed such a payment scheme but met stiff resistance from State governors. See
Pear, supra note 2.
257. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003).
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Presented honestly, the debate is about what degrees of
difference [in public health care] society will allow, what obligation
society has to finance care for those unable to pay, and who should
[S]erious
benefit from public subsidy and in what magnitude.
analysts cannot persuasively defend the principle of total equality of
258
end result.
The Gonzaga decision may mean that Congress has no choice
but to address Medicaid reforms according to these principles, but it
will require painful intellectual honesty and vigorous, unfettered
public debate to get it right.
Mark Andrew Ison*

258. Blumstein, supra note 25, at 1468.
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